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Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times 
 
Daniel A. Farber1 
 
ABSTRACT. This Article investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis during an antiregulatory period.  
The period since 2016 has seen several new developments, including the first vigorous use by Congress of 
its power to overturn recently issued regulations and the creation of novel deregulatory mechanisms layered 
on top of cost-benefit analysis. This period also contains important examples of sharply reversed CBAs, in 
which regulations that were said to have large net benefits under Obama are instead said to have net costs 
under Trump. The Trump Administration’s regulatory review initiatives focus heavily on costs, with limited 
attention to benefits. Case studies of three high-profile regulations show that the economic analysis of one 
is seriously defective, another admits to having severe limitations, and a third systematically reduces the 
scale of benefits. Some of these characteristics may be analytically defensible, others seemingly are not. It 
is even harder to connect Congress’s recent uses of the Congressional Review Act to either a concern about 
net benefits or even a desire to reduce the economic burdens of regulation. Thus, cost-benefit analysis seems 
overall a marginal part of current regulatory policymaking. 
  
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The 2016 elections put the Republican Party in firm control of Congress and the White 
House.  After a year in office, President Trump proudly announced that “[n]o president has ever 
cut so many regulations in their entire term, O.K., as we have cut in less than a year.”2 On this 
issue, at least, he was firmly aligned with Republican orthodoxy.  In 2016, the Republican-
controlled House of Representatives passed a bill to require congressional approval before any 
major new regulation could go into effect in a bid to reduce what Speaker Paul Ryan termed 
excessive regulation.3 The ensuing period included rulemakings to repeal major regulations on 
issues such as climate change, as well as congressional interventions to overturn over twenty other 
regulations.4  
                                               
1 Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Erica Sun for unearthing and 
compiling the data on the Congressional Review Act discussed later in this article. 
2 Linda Quifeb, Trump Says ‘No President Has Ever Cut So Many Regulations.’ Not quite., NY TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/us/politics/trump-says-no-president-has-ever-cut-so-many-
regulations-not-quite.html. 
3 Paul Ryan, Press Release: Reining in Regs (Jan. 5, 2017), available at 
https://paulryan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398593 .  
4 Regarding the Trump Administration’s early activities, Gillian Metzger observes that: 
These actions include specific area rollbacks, such as instructions that agencies repeal, waive, or delay 
implementation of major Obama Administration regulatory initiatives in the environmental, financial 
regulation, and health care arenas. But they also encompass dramatic transsubstantive measures, in particular 
requirements that agencies establish task forces focused on regulatory repeal, repeal two regulations for each 
new regulation they propose, and keep additional regulatory costs at zero.  President Trump’s cabinet is 
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Since the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been 
an integral part of the regulatory process. For over thirty years, regulatory agencies like EPA have 
been required to perform cost-benefit analyses that are subject to review by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is part of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in the White House.5 Most of the focus, however, has been on how CBA operates 
in the context of expanded regulation, not repeal of existing regulations. This Article investigates 
the role of CBA in a period when the government’s major thrust is eliminating regulations.  This 
period has had some novel features, including the first vigorous use by Congress of its power to 
overturn recently issued regulations and novel deregulatory mechanisms layered on top of cost-
benefit analysis.  It also presents important examples of sharply reversed CBAs, in which 
regulations that were said to have large net benefits under Obama are instead said to have net costs 
under Trump. As yet, there has been no comprehensive description or analysis of these 
developments. 
These developments need to be put in the context of the long-running dispute over CBA. 
Although many economists and some legal scholars favor the use of cost-benefit analysis for 
government regulation,6 environmentalists and other progressives are often sharply opposed.7 For 
instance, two leading environmentalist critics of CBA8 contend that “cost-benefit analysis 
promotes a deregulatory agenda under the cover of scientific objectivity.”9 In particular, they argue 
that cost-benefit analysis requires that analysts settle on numbers for all costs and benefits, 
                                               
composed of individuals who have long opposed the agencies and programs they now lead and his budget 
proposes to dramatically slash funding for a large swath of nonmilitary agencies. 
Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2017). 
Metzger also notes that “[b]usiness interests are enjoying a regulatory retraction of unprecedented proportions, with 
the combination of executive branch actions and Congress’s disapproval of late Obama Administration rules under 
the CRA [Congressional Review Act].” Id. a 10.   
5 Regulatory review takes place within the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). For a description of 
the development of OMB’s role in regulatory oversight, along with some useful  suggestions for improving cost-
benefit analysis, see Daniel H. Cole, “Best Practice” Standards for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis, 23 RES. IN LAW 
& ECON. 1 (2007).  ADLER AND POSNER, supra note 6, collects papers reflecting the spectrum of views about CBA 
and its validity.   A description of the rise of attention to CBA in the legal academy can be found in Don Bradford 
Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
1135, 1135-1136 (2008). Finally, for information about the operation of OMB in the Obama Administration, see Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013). 
6 For an introduction to opposing views of cost-benefit analysis, see MATTHEW D. ADLER AND ERIC A. POSNER, COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2001). 
7 For citations to some of the key critical works, see Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and 
Opportunity Costs, 2. J. LAND USE 1, 6 n.23 (2006). 
8 They make it clear, however, that their quarrel is with the economic methodology of cost-benefit analysis, not with 
taking costs and benefits into account: 
[A]nalysis of costs and benefits, in lowercase letters, is an essential part of any systematic thought about 
public policy, and has always been involved in government decision making.  Our criticism concerns the 
much narrower doctrine of Cost-Benefit Analysis, which calls for a specific, controversial way of expressing 
and thinking about costs and benefits. 
FRANK ACKERMAN AND LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF 
NOTHING 211(2004). 
9 Id. at 8-9.  See also id. at 12 (“[c]loaked in the language of scientific objectivity, economic arguments have repeatedly 
played a partisan role”). 
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regardless of uncertainty, putting pressure on them to ignore uncertainties completely or to ignore 
more extreme possibilities even when they do acknowledge variability.10 If these critics are right 
that CBA is only a façade for anti-regulatory sentiment, we would expect it fit smoothly with 
Trump Administration policy.   
Unlike these critics, some writers who are sympathetic to environmental protection 
embrace cost-benefit analysis.11 Although they view it as just one input into the ultimate regulatory 
decision,12 Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore argue that cost-benefit analysis is needed to 
determine when further spending on risk reduction is no longer worthwhile.13 They contend that, 
just as environmental impacts of actions must be taken into account, so should economic impacts 
of regulation.14 They also view cost-benefit analysis as a way to disciplinine the wide discretion 
given to administrative agencies, thereby ensuring that decisions are made on the basis of reasoned 
analysis and uniform criteria.15 If advocates of CBA are right that CBA functions in the 
administrative state as a neutral check on government initiatives, deregulatory policies should be 
as much restricted by CBA as regulatory ones. 
Both the addition of new regulatory restrictions on top of CBA and the exercise of 
congressional overrides on regulations that have passed CBA indicate a lack of confidence in CBA 
as a check in practice on ill-advised regulations. Thus, it would appear, a considerable number of 
conservatives have doubts about the neutrality and objectivity of CBA in practice.16 Advocates of 
CBA, whether economists or sympathetic legal scholars, are thus under pressure from critics on 
both sides. 
This Article seems to improve our understanding of regulatory review, including CBA, by 
studying its use in a period of sustained deregulatory activities.  Even a law review is unlikely to 
require a citation for the assertion that Donald Trump is not a typical American president –an 
assertion that neither President Trump nor his critics would contest. Thus, there are limits on how 
much we can extrapolate from the current period.  On the other hand, as shown by Congress’s 
flexing of its own muscles to disapprove regulations, on this point his goals are those of his entire 
party.  Moreover, a number of his initiatives echo earlier unsuccessful legislative efforts by the 
party. Thus, in the realm of regulatory policy, this period may be less exceptional than other aspects 
of the Trump Presidency. 
                                               
10 Id. at 225. 
11 For a references to the writings of some of the leading academic supporters of cost-benefit analysis, see Kysar, 
supra note 7, at 5. 
12 Id. at 15. 
13 RICHARD L. REVESZ AND MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 12 (2008). 
14 Id. at 13. 
15 Id.  
16 Consider the following comments by a noted administrative law scholar: 
I've testified now four times before various congressional committees on various versions of what is called 
the Regulatory Budget Act. What the opponents of EPA are arguing is that we need a regulatory budget that 
ignores benefit and considers costs only. My defense every time is, no--cost-benefit analysis should be the 
basis for decisionmaking. Cost-benefit analysis is now on the left end of the political spectrum. 
The Future of Administrative Law, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10186, 10195 (2017) (remarks of Richard 
J. Pierce). 
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Our examination of recent developments in regulatory review proceeds as follows.  Part II 
examines the role of OIRA in the Trump era. OIRA has been given new responsibilities on top of 
its existing regulatory review functions. Although the evidence is still scattered, we are also 
beginning to get some sense of how it is handling its traditional functions.  Part III turns to 
regulatory review in Congress. Until 2017, Congress had only once exercised its authority under 
the Congressional Review Act to overturn regulations. In 2017, it made vigorous use of this 
authority to eliminate a host of newly issued regulations.  This use of congressional authority 
deserves closer investigation.  Part IV then looks at how CBA is operating at the agency level. A 
comprehensive survey across the entire government is impractical. Instead, Part IV focuses on a 
single regulatory agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Finally, Part V offers a 
summary and some concluding thoughts. 
The developments discussed in this Article are only one part of a larger attack on the 
regulatory state. As Gillian Metzger has observed, this anti-regulatory movement is reminiscent of 
attacks on the legitimacy of the administrative state in the 1930s.17 The attacks are characterized 
by emotionally charged rhetoric. Metzger notes that “[m]uch advocacy for these legislative and 
regulatory measures describes administrative government in harsh terms, for example invoking 
the need to rein in an “out-of-control bureaucracy” intent on imposing costly, “job-crushing” 
regulations.”18 The larger issues presented by this anti-regulatory movement are beyond the scope 
of this Article.  But, as we will see, one of the current effects of this movement is to reduce the 
centrality of  analytic approach to regulation represented by cost-benefit analysis, largely in favor 
of a heavy emphasis on regulatory costs as opposed to benefits. 
This heavy emphasis on costs in the administrative process represents a fundamental shift 
in regulatory philosophy. The core argument for cost-benefit analysis is that it is simply irrational 
to make decisions without taking into account costs and benefits, and that this can best be done 
through economic analysis. As one prominent advocate for cost-benefit analysis has said, “[i]t is 
not possible to do evidence-based, data-driven without assessing both costs and benefits, and 
without being as quantitative as possible.”19 Fixating on costs while downplaying benefits is in 
considerable tension with this vision of rational decision making.  It is even harder to connect 
Congress’s use of the Congressional Review Act to either a concern about net benefits or a desire 
to reduce the economic burdens of regulation. Our examination suggests a haphazard use of 
congressional review with no obvious driving mission. 
 
II. A Short Primer on Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Shortly after taking office President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,291,20 aimed at 
improving the efficiency of informal rulemaking by executive agencies. Section 2 directed that 
                                               
17 Metzger, supra note 4, at 6. 
18 Id. at 13 (quoting Ronald M. Levin, The REINS Act: Unbridled Impediment to Regulation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1446, 1458–60 (2015), and 163 CONG. REC. H900 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2017) (statement of Rep. Walorski on H.R.J. Res. 
40, 115th Cong. (2017)). 
19 Cass R. Sunstein, Humanizing Cost-Benefit Analysis, Remarks Prepared for American University’s Washington 
College of Law Administrative Law Review Conference, February 17, 2010, p. 13. 20 (“. . . it would be premature to 
say that CBA has received the kind of social consensus now commanded by economic incentives and deregulation of 
airlines, trucking and railroads. I believe that CBA should command such a consensus, at least as a presumption, and 
that the presumption in favor of CBA should operate regardless of political commitments.”). 
20 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
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“major” regulations not be promulgated unless, “taking into account affected industries [and] the 
condition of the national economy,” the potential benefits to society outweigh potential costs, and 
net benefits are at a maximum. Review of agency cost–benefit analyses was conducted by the 
Office of Management and Budget. In 1993, President Clinton issued an executive order 
maintaining the basic approach but attempting to streamline the process of OMB review. The rule 
was intended to reduce the number of regulations sent to OMB for approval and to make OMB’s 
review more flexible.21 President George W. Bush appointed John D. Graham from the Harvard 
Center for Risk Analysis, to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the 
Office of Management and Budget.22 He was the subject of sharp criticism by public interest 
groups.23  Upon taking office, President Obama rescinded President Bush’s executive orders on 
cost–benefit analysis. Essentially, the government then reverted to the Clinton-era version of the 
cost–benefit mandate.  To the surprise of many observers, the Obama Administration turned out 
to be a staunch supporter of cost-benefit analysis, requiring rigorous documentation in support of 
proposed regulations.24 
The “cost” side of CBA is relatively straightforward, at least in principle, since the central 
concern is the immediate economic impact of a regulation on industry.  But the “benefit” side can 
be more complex. We will consider two difficulties on the benefit side of the analysis: the difficulty 
of determining monetary measures for environmental benefits and the fact that these benefits often 
accrue in the future while costs are more immediate.  
For example, suppose we wanted to do a cost–benefit analysis for a method of ending some 
form of water pollution. On the benefit side of the equation, we would need to assign values, based 
on willingness to pay, for the elimination of this source of pollution. Some of these values would 
be relatively easy to determine, given the necessary scientific information—for example, loss in 
profits to fishing boats caused by pollution. At least, the calculations would be straightforward in 
theory, although in litigation expert witnesses may differ sharply with each other about these lost 
profit issues. 
One major valuation issue involves putting a monetary value on reductions in mortality 
risks. Without worrying right now about the technicalities, we could assign monetary values to 
different levels of risk by looking at how much consumers are willing to pay for safer products, or 
how much income workers are willing to give up for safer jobs, or at how much travel time people 
are willing to sacrifice for the safety benefits of driving more slowly. All of these would be 
different ways of determining the market value of safety. 
If people demand $1,000 in return for being exposed to a one in a thousand risk of death, 
it’s conventional to say that the “value of life” is $1 million. This is a bit misleading, since they 
probably would not be willing to commit suicide for that amount of money! To express this 
distinction, economists often speak of the value of a statistical (as opposed to individual) life. To 
                                               
21 See Ellen Siegler, Executive Order 12866: An Analysis of the New Executive Order on Regulatory Planning and 
Review, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10070 (1994). 
22 Thomas O. McGarity, The Story of the Benzene Case: Judicially Imposed Regulatory Reform Through Risk 
Assessment, in Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 169 (2005). 
23 According to McGarity, under Graham’s leadership, “OIRA greatly stemmed the flow of health, safety and 
environmental regulation during the Bush Administration. Although EPA promulgated several important regulations, 
most of which were required by statute, OSHA did not promulgate a single significant health standard during the 
entire four years.” Id. 
24 The head of OIRA during much of the Obama Administration wrote about his experiences in Sunstein, supra note 
5. 
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assign a value of $1 million per statistical life is the same as saying that people would demand $1 
in return for running a one-in-a-million chance of death. 
Often, the costs and benefits of a regulatory measure occur at different times. When the 
costs accrue today but the benefits are in the future, we need some method of taking the time factor 
into account. Global warming or endangered species provide obvious examples because the effects 
of our policy choices are multi-generational. Long-term delayed harms are ubiquitous, however, 
in environmental law. As Lisa Heinzerling points out: 
Radioactive substances are perhaps the most dramatic example of such a long-lived 
threat. [I]n planning for the disposal of the most radioactive of our radioactive wastes, EPA 
has dictated that the disposal site must be one that will remain undisturbed for at least 
10,000 years. 
Other persistent contaminants include [PCBs, DDT], chlordane, dieldrin, and 
dioxin. These can persist in the environment, and in human tissue for many years.... While 
the precise definition of "persistence" remains largely political and practical rather than 
scientific, it nonetheless remains true that today's use and disposal of radioactive 
substances, chlorinated organic compounds, and heavy metals will continue to pose threats 
to human health for many decades, in some cases centuries, to come.25 
For this reason, discounting plays a key part in the economic analysis of environmental 
regulation.26 
The basic idea of discounting is simple. If $1 invested at compound interest today will 
produce $2 in five years, we “discount” the $2 at the same interest rate, concluding that the “present 
value” of $2 receivable in five years is $1 today. 27 Making this adjustment allows us to compare 
different investments whose payoffs have varying time profiles. For instance, suppose we are 
comparing two different contracts. If one contract pays $1.50 today, we know that it is a better 
deal than another which pays $2 in five years, because we can take the $1.50, invest it, and have 
more than $2 in five years. The shorthand way of saying this is that present value of the first 
contract is $1.50, while the present value of the other is only $1. 
Over long time periods, the results of changes in discount rates are enormous, as Cass 
Sunstein explains: “[i]f a human life is valued at $8 million, and if an agency chooses a 10% 
discount rate, a life saved 100 years from now is worth only $581.”28 Thus, what seems at first 
blush to be a niggling technical issue turns out to have a grave significance in evaluating long-term 
regulatory decisions. Discounting is particularly controversial in the multigenerational context. A 
ton of CO2 emitted today will stay in the atmosphere for two to three centuries, continuing to cause 
climate impacts, and global temperatures will remain high, even after we eliminate emissions, for 
                                               
25 Lisa Heinzerling, The Temporal Dimension in Environmental Law, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,055, 11,067 (2001). 
26 An overview of the economics of discounting can be found in Elizabeth Atherton, From Discounting to 
Incorporating Decisions' Long–Term Impacts, 11 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY, & ENV'T 125 (2000). 
27 A concise introduction to discounting can be found in NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 50-
60 (2007). As Stern points out, uncertainty about future growth implies that the discount rate declines for events further 
in the future.  See id. at 56-57. For some reflections on the problems raised by consideration of time in cost-benefit 
analysis even beyond discounting, see Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1215 
(2014). An excellent overview of the debate over the Stern report can be found in Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review 
and Its Critics: Implications for Theory and Practice of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 NAT. RES. 1 (2008). 
28 Cass R. Sunstein, Cost–Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1711 (2001). 
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an even longer time.29 Conversely, a dollar invested in reducing emissions today will provide 
benefits over the same period of time. In assessing the value of this investment, we need to take 
into account the long timespan involved. 
The basic concept behind discounting is that people generally prefer consumption today 
over consumption tomorrow. Suppose someone has the choice between getting some amount of 
money today and $100 a year from now. Even ignoring inflation, most people will be willing to 
take less than $100 dollars today instead of waiting a year. This can be due to several factors – one 
of them is simple impatience, and another is that a person might expect to have more money next 
year anyway, so that person would need the money more badly today.30  
The discount rate measures the degree of preference for the present – for instance, a ten 
percent discount rate means that receiving $100 a year from now is only as good as receiving $90 
today (even apart from inflation). The key point is that the value of receiving a future dollar falls 
over time in accordance with the discount rate. Over a long period of time – the kind of time period 
involved with climate change – the changes are really dramatic because discounting compounds 
as the years go on. For instance, at a 10% discount rate, even without inflation, $100,000 in 2115 
equates to about $7.30 today.31  
Because of the very long-term effects of climate change, discounting is a crucial factor in 
the economic analysis. But economists themselves find it disquieting that discounting “forces us 
to say that what we might otherwise conceptualize as monumental events ‘do not much matter’ 
when they occur in future centuries or millennia.”32 Even if we assume that discounting is 
appropriate when dealing with the effect of policies on current generations, its application to future 
generations raises graver issues. After all, their value as human beings is equal to that of people 
today, yet discounting systematically downgrades their interests, sometimes to the point of 
insignificance.33 
One defense of discounting is that funds spent to avoid climate change could be spent on 
other purposes, which might be more beneficial to future generations. Thus, we might want to 
engage in discounting in the interest of future generations in order to maximize the benefits to 
them of present-day investments. Market rates represent the opportunity cost of investment, so this 
                                               
29 According to Nordhaus, if we do nothing about climate change until 2100 and then stop all emissions, “CO2 would 
remain well above preindustrial levels for a millennium, and global temperature would peak at around 4 ° above 1900 
levels.”  NORDHAUS [2013], supra note 2, at 163. 
30 For specificity, suppose the person in question would take $90 today over $100 a year from now (but not anything 
less). So $90 today equals $100 next year. That means that the person would only make an investment of $90 this year 
if the payout is at least $100, an 11% increase. How much would person want today in exchange for $100 in two 
years? We know that $100 in year 2 equals $90 in year 1, and in turn that equals about $82 dollars today (110% of 
$82 is just over $90). So getting $100 dollars in two years is equivalent to having $82 dollars on hand today, at least 
if the person is being consistent. 
31 The easiest way to generate these figures is to use an on-line app like http://www.aqua-calc.com/page/discounted-
present-value-calculator. Nordhaus uses another set of illustrative figures, showing that the present value of a $100 
million reduction in damages is about $60 million at a 1% rate but falls by almost a factor of 5 at a 4% rate and by a 
about a factor of 65 as 10%.  NORDAUS [2013], supra note 2, at 191. 
32 Martin L. Weitzman, Why the Far-Distant Future Should be Discounted at Its Lowest Possible Rate, 36 J. ENV. 
ECON. & MANAGEMENT 201, 201 (1998). 
33 Some influential economists have argued that discounting should not include any reduction in present value based 
on the intrinsic difference between future and present consumption, as opposed to other factors such as the possibility 
of increasing wealth over time. See STERN, supra note 27, at 35-36. 
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argument suggests that we should avoid climate mitigation projects unless they offer equal 
returns.34 One problem with this argument is that climate change might have catastrophic effects 
on later generations that cannot be offset by increased savings.35  
If discounting is indeed a valid approach, other, more technical difficulties must be 
confronted. As it turns out, the number chosen as the discount rate is very important; small 
differences can be amplified over time into a big difference in the outcome. This can be seen from 
the following table: 
Table 1: Effect of Discount Rate on Present Value 
Discount rate Present value of $6 million 
received in 20 years 
Present value of $6 million 
received in 40 years 
10%    $894,000  $132,570 
7% $1,560,000   $400,682 
5% $2,261,337   $852,274 
3% $3,324,000 $1,839,341 
 
As the table shows, reducing the discount rate from seven to three percent more than triples 
the present value of the eventual benefit over twenty years, from under $1 million to over $3 million. 
Cutting the rate an additional two percent would bring the present value up to nearly $5 million. Over 
longer periods of time, the differences are even more dramatic. For instance, over forty years, raising 
the discount rate from three percent to seven percent reduces the present value almost eighty percent, 
from about $2 million to under half a million. Over eighty years, the difference is $26,934 versus 
$559,494, an almost twenty-fold. 
The bottom line is that discounting makes a big difference in assessing costs and benefits over 
long periods of time, and that difference is quite sensitive to changes in rates. Over multiple-decadal 
time scales, a minor shift in the discount rate can dramatically impact the analysis of whether 
additional precautions are warranted. Given the very long-term effects of climate change, a small 
change in the discount rate can drive huge changes in the results. Yet, there is no consensus about 
what discount rate to use for climate change.36 
There are additional difficulties associated with measuring the value of some other 
environmental benefits: so-called option and existence values. An example of option value might be 
posed by someone who has no particular plans to go to Lake Superior, but who would be willing to 
pay something in order to keep open the option of seeing the lake again if he or she chooses to do so. 
                                               
34 This argument is developed in ERIC A. POSNER AND DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010). 
35 Another argument for discounting is that, given economic growth, future generations are likely to be much wealthier 
than current generations, even taking into account climate change. Why should present generations sacrifice to make 
future generations even richer – isn’t this in effect transferring money from the (relatively) poor to the (relatively) 
rich? But future growth rates may be uncertain. Even today, although technology is a constant, individual countries 
have much different records of growth, which suggests that other factors are also crucial. Given the limits on how well 
we understand growth, we may not have any real assurance that present growth rates will continue. 
36 For a concise overview of the relevant literature, see Charles Kolstad and Kevin Urama, Social, Economic, and 
Ethical Concepts and Methods, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 228-232 (2014). 
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Existence values are even more ethereal—for example, the amount of money a person would be 
willing to pay to save rain forests, although it may be extremely unlikely that she would ever go there. 
"Use values" flow from some direct physical interaction with a natural resource, such as recreational 
use of a forest. In contrast, non-use values don't involve any observable current effects.37  
Many economists advocate the use of "contingent valuation" studies to measure how much 
people are willing to pay for non-use values. Contingent valuation is essentially a survey technique. 
People are given information about an environmental issue and then asked if they would be willing to 
pay a certain amount to solve the problem. There is a great deal of dispute about whether contingent 
valuation can provide a genuine measure of preferences. Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued that 
many contingent valuation analyses should not be taken seriously. He stressed what he described as 
the "astonishing and devastating fact" that willingness to pay seems constant regardless of the scale of 
the environmental problem. In responding to surveys, he contends, "people may be purchasing moral 
satisfaction rather than stating their real valuation," merely proclaiming their unwillingness to feel 
responsible for environmental harms.38 Economists critical of contingent valuation view the resulting 
numbers as mostly reflecting the warm glow that people get by announcing their support for the 
environment. These critics doubt that people actually have preferences about specific environmental 
sites or that their responses reflect considered efforts to assess such preferences.39 
But this view is by no means universal among economists. Advocates of contingent valuation 
argue that the critics have exaggerated the problems, that many problems can be limited through 
careful survey design, and that contingent valuation can be validated against other measures of 
environmental benefits. Regulations governing damages for injury to public resources due to oil spills 
or toxic chemicals call for the application of contingent valuation, and courts have upheld this 
methodology.40 
As this discussion indicates, cost-benefit analysis can involve difficult technical issues about 
how to assess regulatory benefits.  The cost side of the analysis generally involves investments by 
business or increased operating costs, which are straightforward in principle but may be difficult to 
forecast in practice.  Thus, controversy about cost-benefit analysis tends to revolve around whether 
benefits are being appropriately quantified. 
 
III. Regulatory Review in Congress 
Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA),41 Congress has the power to reject agency 
regulations within a limited time frame, subject to presidential veto.  Under the CRA, before major 
rules can go into effect, agencies must notify Congress, which then has a specified period of time in 
                                               
37 For introductions to these concepts, see Christopher D. Stone, What to do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, 
Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 580–88 (1995). 
38 Cass R. Sunstein, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 142–43 (1997). For an environmentalist critique of 
contingent valuation, see John Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995). 
39 See Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45, 56, 63; Brian Binger et al., Contingent Valuation Methodology in the Natural Resource 
Damage Regulatory Process: Choice Theory and the Embedding Phenomenon, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 443 (1995). 
40See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772-774 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (natural resource damages 
for oil spills); Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior ("Ohio"), 880 F.2d 432, 463-464  (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(natural resource damages under CERLA). 
41 5 U.S.C. §§801-808. 
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which to consider a joint resolution of disapproval. If a joint resolution of disapproval becomes law, 
the CRA provides that a rule may not be issued in “substantially the same form” without additional 
statutory authorization. The scope of this prohibition remains unclear.42 Understanding the CRA’s 
operation is important, not only to fill out the picture of regulatory review but also because it sheds 
light on the desirability of legislative proposals such as the REINS Act, which would give Congress 
even more control over rules.43 
After Trump’s election ushered in unified government, Congress made aggressive use of the 
CRA against Obama Administration regulations. As Cary Coglianese and Gabriel Scheffler have 
observed, “[a]s other GOP legislative efforts have sputtered, these CRA repeals ‘arguably constitute 
the Trump Administration's chief domestic policy accomplishment of its first 100 days.’ Although it 
is hard to tell, this CRA effort was seemingly effected through collaboration between the President 
and Congress, even if not all CRA resolutions were ultimately successful.”44 On average, the 
resolutions passed Congress with numbers corresponding to the Republican majority in each house.45 
The CRA’s time limits preclude careful congressional consideration, and its fast-track procedural 
provisions can the normal process of deliberation.46  
Based on several case studies, Daniel Cole has hypothesized that cost-benefit analysis may 
help defuse political opposition in cases where the cost-benefit analysis is positive.”47 This is a 
plausible hypothesis and may have particular relevance in the context of CRA process. The tight time 
frame, combined with the fact that members of Congress are generalists,48 might be expected to 
increase the salience of the cost-benefit analyzes conducted by agencies and approved by OIRA. 
Republican members of Congress might well think that the Obama Administration exaggerated the 
                                               
42 For further detail about the CRA, see Maeve P. Carey, Alissa M. Dolan, and Christopher M. Davis, The 
Congressional Review Act: Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 17, 2016), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf. 
43 On the REINS Act, see David Schoenbrod, How REINS Would Improve Environmental Protection, 21 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL'Y F. 347 (2011). 
44 Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in A Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of 
Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 602 (2018) 
45 Thomas O. McGarity, Rena Steinzor, James Goodwin, and Katherine Tracy, The Congressional Review Act: The 
Case for Repeal 3 (May 2018), http://progressivereform.org/articles/CRA_Repeal_Case_050218.pdf (hereinafter 
Case for Repeal). Vice President Pence had to break ties in order to secure the passage of two of the resolutions.  Id. 
46 As Coglianese and Scheffler explain,  
In contrast to the years that agencies spent evaluating comments and analyzing their regulations, it took 
Congress a mere four months on average—including congressional recesses—for both chambers to vote to 
repeal the fifteen regulations, mostly on party-line votes. Even if Congress wanted to take a more deliberate 
approach, the CRA’s fast-track procedures explicitly limit the time for floor debate on resolutions of 
disapproval.  
Cary Coglianese and Gabriel Scheffler, What Congress’s Repeal Efforts Can Teach Us About Regulatory Reform, 3 
ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 43, 53 (2017). 
47 Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 88 (2012). Cole suggests that “CBAs 
nearly always influence and can determine political outcomes, even when they are not supposed to do so under existing 
legal rules” and that “federal agencies, even when legally barred from considering cost, have incentives to produce 
and sometimes strategically manipulate CBAs to preempt or undermine political opposition to regulatory or 
deregulatory proposals,” though this strategy can fail when the CBA is clearly flawed. Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 58 (2012) 
48 Id. at 54.  
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benefits of regulations and undercounted the costs.  Nevertheless, given a shortage of time and little 
specialized knowledge, a better cost-benefit ratio should be a signal of a regulation’s value as 
compared to regulations with worse economic attributes.  By analogy, if we know that a certain 
professor is an easy grader, the grades may still remain informative after we compensate for that bias: 
an A remains a better grade than a B, perhaps even more so in the case of the easy grader, for whom 
a B is a very low grade. 
The general question of how much cost-benefit analysis actually impacts government decisions 
is not easy to investigate in any systematic way.  It is very difficult to test the significance of cost-
benefit analysis with respect to decision-making in the executive branch, although even its most 
fervent advocates admit that it fades in significance when hot political issues are involved.49 The 
problem is that we cannot observe political influences on the cost-benefit analysis itself, so we cannot 
be sure whether the CBA has influenced the ultimate political decisions or whether causation runs 
from politics to CBA instead, with the cost-benefit tilted toward an outcome that political actors have 
already decided.  
In contrast, the use of the Congressional Review Act in 2017 could provide a much better 
research setting. Many of the CBAs that were subject to Congressional review, however, were 
probably largely completed well before the 2018 election, when there was little reason to anticipate a 
Trump victory.50 If Hillary Clinton had been elected President, the CRA resolutions would 
undoubtedly have been vetoed, so agencies had little to worry about.  Thus, there is at least somewhat 
less reason to think that the CBAs would have been written with the prospect of congressional review 
in mind.   
In order to test the influence of cost-benefit analysis on CRA actions, a research assistant and 
I collected information on the agencies for which CRA resolutions had been introduced.51 (An 
Appendix contains a list of the regulations in question.52) The initial hope was that we would be able 
to determine whether net benefits, total costs, total benefits, or cost-benefit ratios were different 
between the regulations that were ultimately invalidated by Congress and those that were not. Sadly, 
such a statistical analysis turned out not to be possible because there were too few regulations for 
which a cost-benefit analysis was performed.  The following table gives the salient features of the two 
groups —regulations that were repealed and regulations for which CRA resolutions did not result in 
repeal.53 
                                               
49 Cass R. Sunstein, ThE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 211 (2018). 
50 Even for those regulations that were hurriedly completed in the weeks between the election and Trump’s 
inauguration, the CBA to accompany the proposed version of the rule would probably have been completed earlier, 
limiting the agency’s ability to make major changes credibly. 
51 We intend to continue this research in a second phase in order to obtain a better grasp of the political dynamics 
involved in use of the CRA.  
52 On December 12, 2018, the Senate passed a CRA resolution against a deregulatory action by the Trump 
Administration relating to campaign finance, which was expected to fail in the House. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, 
Senate Votes to Overturn Trump Administration Donor Disclosure Rule for ‘Dark Money’ Groups, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-votes-to-overturn-trump-administration-donor-
disclosure-rule-for-dark-money-groups/2018/12/12/92d8d93a-fe3d-11e8-ad40-
cdfd0e0dd65a_story.html?utm_term=.386629a567cc. This resolution was not included in the analysis. 
53 Some cautions are in order. The final numbers may change since we are continuing to refine them. Also, cost-benefit 
information may have been available to Congress from sources other than the rules themselves, and we are continuing 
to examine those other information sources. A number of rules stated that they were classified as significant without 
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Tables 2: Regulations with CRA Resolution Characteristics by Outcome54 
 Percent 
economically 
significant 
Percent 
otherwise 
designated as 
significant 
Percent 
designated as 
unfunded 
mandates 
Percent 
with RIAs 
Percent with 
Relevant 
Quantified 
Benefits 
Percent with 
Relevant 
Quantified 
Costs 
Repealed 
(N=14) 
12.4% (2)55 21% (3) 0% 50% (7) 21% (3) 57% (8) 
Not 
repealed 
(N=22) 
23% (5) 
 
 
14% (3) 5% (1) 23% (5) 23% (5) 54% (12) 
Total 
(N=36) 
19% (7) 17% (6) 3% (1) 33% (12) 22% (8) 55% (20) 
 
Many rules escaped Congressional review entirely. For instance, during the July to December 
2017 included in the period open to congressional review at the start of the Trump Administration,56 
a search on reginfo.gov turns up forty-nine published final rules that were classified as economically 
significant. Yet the total number of economically significant rules reviewed by Congress in 2017 was 
only six, around fifteen percent of the total number. One might have expected a larger number of CRA 
resolutions to be introduced, since doing so has no cost to a legislator and might please some local 
industry. This is one of many puzzles about the use of the CRA. 
Perhaps most surprising was the lack of any apparent connection between cost and the outcome 
of the congressional review process: most of the high-cost regulations survived the process intact. It 
is also surprising that the minority of regulations in both categories were designated as “otherwise 
significant” – apparently, the agencies did not anticipate that some regulations would be so 
controversial. Because only a third of the regulations even had quantified benefits, asking questions 
about their cost-benefit ratios or net benefits would have involved small numbers, making a statistical 
analysis pointless. Regulations accompanied by a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) seemed to be less 
likely to survive congressional review. 
If Congress had been concerned with the economic impact of regulations, we might have 
expected it to concentrate its attention on regulations with annual costs over $100 million.  It is also 
remarkable that roughly two-thirds of the regulations that attracted CRA resolutions were not 
considered significant by the agency or the White House. Either the Executive Branch was remarkably 
obtuse, or the features that attract congressional attention to a regulation are imperfectly understood 
                                               
an explicit statement of whether this was on the basis of cost, and the classifications of some of those rules might 
change. But we do not expect the final figures to differ substantially. 
54 Note: these statistics reflect items that are clearly found in the text of the regulation. In other words, the “Percent 
with RIAs” reflects regulations that made it clear a RIA was performed. We are continuing a search of whether RIAs 
may have been issued and available to Congress in other cases but not referenced in the regulations. 
55 This includes one rule that did not explicitly state it was classified as significant on this basis or use the phrase 
“economically significant,” but where we were able to confirm that the annual costs were over $100 million. 
56 See Michael Grunwald, Trump’s Secret Weapon Against Obama’s Legacy, POLITICO (April 10, 2017) (Republicans 
had “until early May to eliminate Obama rules finalized after last June”), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/donald-trump-obama-legacy-215009.  
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by administrators.57  Some of the regulations involved hot button issues for conservatives like guns or 
contraception. Others had impact on extractive industries that are close to the Republican party, 
notably the oil industry.58 The reasons for congressional opposition to other regulations are not 
obvious.  
There is, in any event, little evidence that consideration of quantified costs and benefits played 
an important role in congressional decision-making. It may still be true that cost-benefit analysis did 
have salience to Congress in ways that we have not been able to observe.  It is also possible that cost-
benefit analysis influences Congress through channels such as committee hearings that are short-
circuited by the CRA. Finally, the political atmosphere of the early Trump Administration may not 
reflect the normal operation of Congress. Thus, it would be premature to view our findings as 
disproving Cole’s hypothesis that cost-benefit analysis influences Congress.  At least, however, the 
findings clearly do not confirm this hypothesis.  
 
III. Regulatory Review Policies and OIRA’s Role 
We now turn from the possible use of regulatory analysis in the legislative branch to the 
executive branch. Almost immediately after taking office, Trump issued an executive order that 
imposed onerous new restrictions on agency rulemaking.59  If they remain in effect over the long-term, 
the requirements created in the executive order have the potential to transform the regulatory process. 
In the meantime, it is important to see whether OIRA’s traditional role as reviewer of cost-benefit 
analysis has exercised any influence over deregulation, or whether in contrast OIRA has simply 
rubberstamped deregulatory measures.   In this section, the we examine this executive order and 
consider how OIRA has performed its role as overseer of the regulatory state since 2016. 
A.  The “Two-for-One” Executive Order (EO 13771) 
Within the first two weeks of office, President Trump issued an executive order on regulatory 
reform. E.O. 13771 contained two requirements.  The first is the so-called two-for-one rule. Section 
2(a) of the order provided that “whenever an executive department or agency (agency) publicly 
proposes for notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall identify at least 
two existing regulations to be repealed.” Section 2(b) instructed agencies that “the total incremental 
cost of all new regulations, including repealed regulations, to be finalized this year shall be no greater 
than zero.”  Regarding future years, the OMB was charged with setting future regulatory budgets for 
agencies under section 3(d). Section 2(d) also charged OMB with issuing guidance to agencies. 
                                               
57 These findings are consistent with the conclusions drawn in Case for Repeal: 
Almost none of the rules that were repealed were all that controversial while they were under development. 
Among the rules eligible for repeal under the CRA, they did not impose the greatest costs on polluters or 
employers indifferent to unsafe working conditions; nor did the supporters of the repeal efforts attempt to 
make any credible case that they were an impediment to economic growth or job creation. Even Marc Short, 
President Trump’s legislative affairs director, admitted as much, conceding at a White House briefing that 
“not each one of these [CRA repeals] can you look at and say it is necessarily a job creator.” 
Case for Repeal, supra note 45, at 7. 
58 The group of cases in which CRA was invoked included one (the abolition of net neutrality) where the Democrats 
unsuccessfully attempted to overturn the regulation. 
59 President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 
FED. REG. 9339 (2017). 
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Finally, under section 4(a), these requirements do not apply to the government’s “military, national 
security, or foreign affairs” functions. 
This Executive Order is profoundly at odds with the core rationale of cost-benefit analysis. As 
Cass Sunstein has said: 
For some agencies, the right approach might be “zero in, ten out,” because there’s no justification 
for anything new and a lot have to go.  For other agencies, the right approach could be “ten in, 
zero-out,” because all ten have benefits well exceeding costs, and there’s really nothing to 
eliminate. It follows that the right approach is not “one in, two out”: but a careful check on issuing 
new rules, with the help of cost-benefit analysis – accompanied by an insistence on issuing those 
rules if the benefits justify the costs and an ambitious program for scrutizing rules on the books 
to see if they should be scrapped.60 
OIRA issued a guidance document clarifying some issues about the order.61 In terms of 
coverage, the Executive Order applies to significant rules and guidance documents (essentially 
meaning those subject to OIRA review anyway).62 The OIRA guidance also clarifies the definition of 
costs, indicating that the costs of a deregulatory action do not include all foregone financial benefits 
—for instance, if a regulation led to increased efficiency or reduced medical expenses, these constitute 
foregone benefits but not costs in terms of a deregulatory action.63  Thus, a deregulatory action could 
in fact impose large costs on society that would not be counted for purposes of the executive order. 
Alan Krupnick, a well-regarded environmental economist, has said that a fundamental problem with 
Trump’s plan to reform regulatory rulemaking is that regulations can be eliminated that have larger 
benefits to society as costs,” because a regulation’s possible net costs is only one of several alternative 
grounds for selecting regulations for repeal.64  Agencies must continue to use cost-benefit analysis, 
however, for all regulatory actions.65  Thus, at least in theory, any deregulatory action would have 
larger benefits than costs, or to put it another way, the regulation being repealed would have to have . 
However, in setting the deregulatory agenda, the focus seems to be only on the cost side of the 
equation, rather than on net costs. 
                                               
60 Sunstein, supra note 49, at 210. Earlier, Sunstein says that he has a “decisive objection” to both the regulatory budget 
and the two-for-one requirement for these reasons.  Id. at 20-21. 
61 Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Administrator Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Guidance Implementing 
Executive Order 13771, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” (April 5, 2017), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf. 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 Id. at 9. 
64 Alan J. Krupnick, Trump’s Regulatory Reform Process: Anaolytical Hurdles and Missing Benefits, Resources (June 
2017), available at http://www.rff.org/research/publications/trump-s-regulatory-reform-process-analytical-hurdles-
and-missing-benefits. Krupnick argues that, given the fact that previous regulations had to survive cost-benefit 
analysis to the extent consistent with law, “there will be few regulations with estimated benefits less than estimated 
costs,” and many rules may involve the other factors in the executive order, so “there is no guarantee this benefit–cost 
criteria will be an effective check on eliminating rules with high net benefits.” Id. Even if, contrary to Krupnick’s 
analysis, agencies select only regulations with net costs to repeal, there is still a problem. Under the executive order, 
a regulation’s net cost is not one of the factors to be considered in prioritizing regulatory repeals, only its gross cost 
(ignoring offsetting benefits.) But it is the net cost of regulations that should be the key factor, because the net cost 
measures the extent of the rule’s real burden on society. For instance, given two rules of equal cost, the agency should 
repeal the rule with smaller benefits, because that rule is more harmful to society. 
65 Id. at 13. 
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The past two years have not provided a real opportunity to see how EO 13371 is actually 
working in practice. It does not appear that the EO 13371 currently imposes a a genuine constraint on 
agencies, in that agencies are far exceeding their requirements.66 In Fiscal Year 2017, which included 
eight months of the Trump Administration, agencies issued sixty deregulatory actions and only three 
regulatory actions, a 22:1 ratio.  OIRA also reported that agencies saved $8.1 billion in regulatory 
costs.  For example, EPA completed sixteen deregulatory actions and only one regulatory action, for 
a net cost-savings of $571 million. Roughly the same pattern seems to have persisted through 
September 2018, with many deregulatory actions. Thus, at present, Executive Order 13771 seems 
more significant in other respects: as a signal of the Administration’s priority on deregulation; the 
Administration’s intention to use of the number of regulations and total compliance cost as metrics; 
and an obstacle to any errant agencies seeking to engage in discretionary regulation actions. 
The numerical, two-for-one portion of the order seems to be more of a public relations gesture 
than a serious effort at deregulation. Jodi Short has provided a careful critique of arguments that the 
number of regulations has significant causal effects.67 Empirical studies based on regulation counts 
cannot cope with the diversity of regulatory provisions in scale and effect, not all of which are burdens 
on industry, and with definitional problems.68  Thus, we lack any strong reason to think that the number 
of regulations is economically significant. 
The FY 2017 ratio of twenty-two to one between deregulation over regulation cited above 
exemplifies some of the problems with bean counting. Apart from the fact that a third of the 
deregulatory actions actually began under President Obama, a number of the others involved relatively 
inconsequential actions. It is far from clear that the number of regulations is a significant data point.69 
As Professor Cary Coglianese put it, “It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that administrative 
officials are removing 22 ‘Peter Rabbit’ books from the regulators’ shelves for every one ‘War and 
Peace’ they add.”70 The administration’s 2018 regulatory agenda showed thirty-two deregulatory 
actions and twenty regulatory ones; the deregulatory actions include “allowing the importation of fresh 
pomelo fruit from Thailand and pine shoot beetle deregulation.”71 The same pattern of few new 
regulations and many (often inconsequential) deregulatory actions  seems to have persisted through 
September 2018, though much more important deregulatory actions are in the works.72 OIRA’s Fall 
2018 regulatory agenda stated that agencies had achieved $23 billion in net regulatory cost savings 
across the government, issuing 176 deregulatory actions (including 57 significant deregulatory 
                                               
66 OIRA, Regulatory Reform: Two-for-One Status Report and Regulatory Cost Caps -- Executive Order 13771: Final 
Accounting for Fiscal Year 2017 and Cost Caps for Fiscal Year 2018, available 
athttps://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/FINAL_TOPLINE_All_20171207.pdf 
67 Jodi L. Short, The Trouble With Counting: Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting (forthcoming, Minnm. 
L. Rev. 2018). 
68 Id. at 19-49. 
69 Glenn Kessler, Has the Trump Administration Repealed 22 Regulations for Each New One?, WASH. POST (August 
3, 2018), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/08/03/has-the-trump-
administration-repealed-22-regulations-for-each-new-one/?utm_term=.acc41fc84bdd.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72  Connor Raso, How has Trump’s Deregulatory Order Worked in Practice?, Brookings Institution (Sept. 6, 2018), 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-has-trumps-deregulatory-order-worked-in-practice/.  
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actions) and 14 significant regulatory actions.73 More generally, data-related rules (record-keeping, 
monitoring, and disclosure) may be especially appealing targets for repeal since compliance costs can 
be determined relatively easily but the benefits of such rules may be diffuse and unlikely to attract 
public scrutiny.74 
The regulatory budget aspect of EO 13771 may be more significant than the two-for-one rule.75 
The debate about regulatory budgeting has been underway for some time, and such measures in various 
forms have been used in other countries.76 Susan Dudley, a former OIRA head, argues that regulatory 
budgets may counter the incentives for agencies to overregulate and pad their estimates of regulatory 
benefits.77 Presumably, she does not consider OIRA’s efforts to ensure objective cost-benefit analyses 
sufficient to counter this threat.78 But it would seem equally plausible that in deregulatory 
administrations the opposite incentive would apply, leading agencies to exaggerate costs and minimize 
estimates of benefits.  
In short, a regulatory budget is an effective cure for OIRA’s inability to police agency cost-
benefit analyzes only under contestable assumptions about agency incentives and OIRA’s information 
capacities. Indeed, if those assumptions are valid, it would seem to make more sense to abolish cost-
benefit analysis entirely, impose a regulatory budget, and count on agencies to maximize societal 
benefits subject to their budget constraint. No one seems to be proposing this, which seems to suggest 
a lack of confidence in the argument made by Dudley and others. 
Moreover, regulatory budgeting could result in an agency’s inability to undertake actions with 
large net social benefits. The reason is that to do so, it must identify existing regulations with higher 
total costs. The pool of potential offsets is further limited because each of the repeals must also pass 
cost-benefit analysis. Thus, an agency could not rescind regulations with small net benefits in order to 
offset the compliance cost of a new regulation with much larger benefits. Unless the agency can find 
enough regulations with negative net benefits to use as cost offsets, it cannot adopt discretionary 
regulations with large public benefits under the executive order (at least without obtaining a waiver 
from OIRA). Assuming that OIRA has been even partially effective in ensuring that projects have net 
                                               
73OIRA, Introduction to the Fall 2018 Regulatory Plan, available at 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201810/VPStatement.pdf.  
74 See American Bar Association, Environmental Protection in the Trump EPA, ch. 2 (Spring 2018) (unpaginated), 
available at https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/book_pdfs/environmentalprotectiontrumpera.pdf.  
75 For a discussion of regulatory budgets and their implementation in the United Kingdom and two-for-one rules, see 
Jeffrey Rosen  and Brian Callanan, The Regulatory Budget Revisited 66 ADMIN. L. REV.  835 (2014).   
76 For a laudatory account of the Canadian experience by an autho,r at a libertarian thinktank, see Sean Speer, 
Regulatory Budgeting: Lessons from Canada (R Street Policy Study No. 54) (March 2018), available at 
https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSTREET54.pdff. 
77 See Susan Dudley, Regulating Within a Budget, REGULATORY Review (April 23, 2018). For a discussion of the 
experience with regulatory budgeting in the United Kingdom, see Benjamin M. Miller,, Inching Toward Reform: 
Trump’s Deregulation and Its Implementation 9-10, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE241.html. 
78 Similarly, an early advocate of regulatory budgets argued against including any consideration of regulatory benefits 
because “[a]gencies inevitably believe that all of their regulations confer net benefits. To remedy this, agencies subject 
to a budget would not be allowed to offset regulatory costs with benefits, since no regulation would fail to qualify 
under agencies’ internal criteria.”  Crews Jr., Clyde, Promise and Peril: Implementing a Regulatory Budget 7 (April 
1996), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758788.  Presumably, the theory is that OIRA cannot adequately police 
the agency’s estimates of benefits, while it can more effectively do so for costs. But if this is correct, the right solution 
would seem to be to impose a regulatory budget and eliminate cost-benefit analysis, leaving it to the agency to use its 
own judgment (which OIRA can’t supervise effectively anyway) to select the regulations that have the greatest 
benefits within that budget.   
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social benefits, the pool of available regulations to repeal may be quite limited. RAND researchers 
conclude that “the new EO could easily remove more benefits of regulation than costs,” particularly 
given its focus on deregulating as opposed to identifying more efficient ways to achieve regulatory 
goals.79 Thus, for the executive order to be effective, OIRA must either have performed its oversight 
role quite poorly in the past or cost-benefit analyses, however well conducted, must be quite poor at 
forecasting costs and benefits.  Otherwise, there would be only a small pool of regulations that would 
qualify as offsets. 
Finally, an assessment of the costs and benefits of regulatory budgeting must include 
opportunity costs. As RAND researchers point out, implementation “will significantly increase the 
amount of effort OMB and regulating agencies must put toward monitoring regulatory costs,” 
including costs of regulations not previously subject to regulatory review. Moreover, agencies will 
need to go through the rulemaking process for at least three times as many rules as they did previously: 
once for the rule they want to adopt, and at least twice for the rules they need to repeal.  Given limited 
agency resources, the result will be that the agency will be able to issue fewer new regulations even if 
those regulations have net social benefits. 
An assessment of the two-for-one and regulatory budget requirements seems hard to 
disentangle from assumptions about the operation of the regulatory state.  The EO 13771 requirements 
make sense if (1) regulatory agencies are prone toward ill-considered regulation; (2) cost-benefit 
analysis and OIRA review have been relatively weak checks; (3) the  pool of existing regulations with 
negative social value is relatively easy to identify; and (4) there are a limited number of potential new 
regulations with substantial net benefits. These seem to have been the assumption of Trump’s first 
OIRA Administrator, who said “too often in the previous administration the benefits were exaggerated 
and the costs downplayed” and that “most agencies have lots of cost savings they can go after.”80 
Notably, in the transcript of a discussion with her, variants of the word “cost” were used eighty times 
whereas the word “benefit” was used only forty-eight times, of which five were general references to 
cost benefit analysis. These anti-regulatory assumptions are surely more widespread among 
conservatives other than herself. 
In principle, the questions listed above present empirical issues, but there is insufficient 
evidence to settle any of them clearly and perhaps may never be. It would require a massive 
investigation of past regulations to determine whether the regulatory process has been as seriously 
flawed as EO 13771 seems to presume, and there is little prospect that such a study will ever take 
place. Thus, anti-regulatory conservatives who are highly skeptical about the regulatory state will see 
the requirements of EO 13771 as beneficial based on their own assumptions.  Those who do not share 
those assumptions will instead see them as roadblocks to beneficial regulatory actions. 
This discussion  of the effects of regulatory budgetsremains highly theoretical under the Trump 
Administration. The operation of the offset and budgeting requirements is predicated on the issuance 
of new regulations, which are likely to be scarce in this Administration. Whether the Executive Order 
will be contained by later Presidents is unknowable, but its linkage with Trump may affect the politics 
of retaining it. That, of course, will depend on whether Trump proves to be the harbinger of the future 
or instead sparks an effective counter movement. 
                                               
79 Id. at 19. 
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C. OIRA Jurisdiction and Operations 
A smaller, but still significant change, in White House review involved tax regulations.  Under 
agreements dating to the Reagan and Bush Administrations, some tax regulations were exempt from 
the normal White House review process.81 A new memorandum of agreement between OMB and 
Treasury modifies that exemption.82 It provides for OIRA review of treasury regulations under three 
circumstances. First, OIRA will review when regulations create “a serious inconsistency or otherwise 
interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency.”83 Second, regulations will be subject to 
review when they “raise novel legal or policy issues, such as by prescribing a rule of conduct backed 
by an assessable payment.”84  Finally, regulations will be subject to review if they have “an annual 
non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more, measured against a no-action baseline.”85 
Although the Government Accountability Office had called for reconsideration of the OIRA 
exemption for tax regulation,86 the change was not easily adopted. The MOU was the result of a power 
struggle between the head of OMB and the Treasury Secretary.87 Other political actors were divided, 
with some favoring Treasury in order to obtain faster implementation of a major tax reform law, while 
some members of Congress were “rooting for Mr. Mulvaney’s office to wield greater oversight of the 
tax law, in the hopes that it would push for the most lenient interpretations of regulations that enable 
the largest number of businesses to pay lower rates under the law.”88 Former officials were concerned 
that OIRA review would invite greater involvement by White House political staff and provide another 
avenue for access by lobbyists.89 
Early reports on implementation of the rule indicate that OIRA has not yet rejected any 
proposed tax regulations; there have been “several back-and-forth exchanges,” although Treasury has 
not disclosed what changes were made in response to the comments.90 Industry representatives have 
reported varied experiences in meeting with OIRA and Treasury officials, with one describing a silent, 
“stoic” audience, while “two other lobbyists, who attended separate meetings, said there was some 
dialogue between the industry representatives and the officials present, although they both noted it 
was almost exclusively OMB and OIRA staff who interacted, rather than anyone from Treasury.”91 
Other officials have also been involved: “a National Economic Council official attended two meetings 
on the highly anticipated section 199A passthrough deduction regulation, and a senior adviser with 
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the Department of Housing and Urban Development was at a meeting about the regulations addressing 
state and local income tax deduction workaround strategies.”92 These lobbyists “indicated that with 
the deregulation-focused Trump administration in power, they view the meetings with the OMB, and 
the agency itself, as a potential backstop against tax regs that may be damaging to their interests, based 
on the statutes or on prior statements by Treasury,” and they added that they were pleased with the 
eventual regulations.93 It remains to be seen whether OIRA involvement will lead to improved 
regulation or whether the fears of the opponents of the change will be realized, with more political and 
special interest influence over regulations.  
It is difficult to tease out the actual role played by OIRA in reviewing regulations because the 
process is so opaque. In particular, it is hard to know the extent to which OIRA is acting as an honest 
economic broker as opposed to providing a channel for the president’s agenda or special interests. 
David Barron suggested a decade ago that OMB may not be easily amenable to presidential influence, 
because it is a technocratic organization, largely staffed by civil servants, and dedicated to the goal of 
minimizing regulatory costs.94 More recently, Michael Livermore observed that the heads of OIRA 
under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations tended to exercise a moderating influence on 
administration policy, having “less of an ideological ax to grind than the median political appointee in 
their respective administrations.”95 It is unclear whether Trump’s first administrator, Noemi Rao, was 
been able to play this role, or whether her successor will be able to do so. 
One concern is about how OIRA sees its own role in terms of deregulation.  In principle, it is 
just as important to assess the costs and benefits of proposed deregulations as for proposed regulations. 
In fact, in most instances, a higher level of scrutiny would be justified because the target of repeal is 
itself a regulation that has passed through OIRA scrutiny. But OIRA may not see its function that way, 
and it might also lack as much leverage in deregulatory cases.  Neither of those conclusions would 
surprise OIRA’s progressive critics, who have always seen cost-benefit analysis as a façade for 
justifying reductions in regulatory protections for the public. 
Whatever the reason, it is unclear whether OIRA is functioning effectively as an objective 
economic overseer of deregulation. Assessment of OIRA’s performance is difficult because some of 
its most important activities, such as consultation with agencies before regulations are even proposed, 
are non-public. Even aspects of OIRA’s activities that are supposed to be public often are not 
disclosed.  Thus, judgments about OIRA’s policy impact must be based to some extent on surmises 
from the available clues. 
On at least one occasion, OIRA was either cut out of the process or engaged in only 
extraordinarily cursory review. OIRA’s website initially showed that EPA issued a proposed rule, 
which substantially limited the types of scientific evidence that it would consider in rulemakings, 
before OIRA had completed its review.96 After this discrepancy was publicized, OIRA revised the 
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date of completion of the review to be earlier.97 According to the revised record, OIRA completed its 
review in only four days, but it appears that some significant changes were made in the proposed rule 
during that time.98 On another occasion, it took OIRA only three days to review of a proposal to delay 
major regulations of methane emissions, leaving no time for input to OIRA from the public or other 
agencies.99 On average, however, OIRA took fifty-two days to review nonsignificant rules.100 
Obviously, there was a serious lapse in the review process in some cases with truncated review, but it 
is difficult to know if this is a symptom of a broader problem. 
On another occasion, it appears that OIRA did its job appropriately but was overruled by White 
House political staff. The Labor Department proposed repealing an Obama Administration rule that 
limited pooling of tips by employers.  The proposal would have allowed employers to participate in 
the pool, reducing the amount of tips ultimately paid to employees.  Within the Department, political 
appointees forced staff to progressively lower estimates of the amount of diverted tips, which were 
originally estimated at billions of dollars, down to $640 million.  OIRA insisted that this amount be 
included in the analysis, but the head of OMB overruled it and allowed the Department to delete the 
estimate.101 In interviews, fifteen former Cabinet-level and White House officials said “in their senior-
level government rulemaking experience, they couldn’t recall a single instance in which OIRA was 
ordered to approve a regulation that didn’t include any form of quantitative analysis when OIRA knew 
such data was available.”102 
Both of these incidents raise concerns about whether OIRA is in a position to ensure adequate 
analysis of proposals. At this point, however, we have no way of knowing whether these incidents 
were aberration or part of a larger pattern.103 There are, however, at least grounds for real concern 
about OIRA’s ability to function professionally under Trump.  
D. Agency-Specific Modifications of Cost-Benefit Guidelines 
Two initiatives at EPA would modify its future use of cost-benefit analysis in a way 
inconsistent with OIRA’s general guidelines for agencies. The fact that these initiatives are proceeding 
may be an indication of a loss of ability of OIRA to enforce its own guidelines against agencies. These 
initiatives are at odds with OIRA’s announced “larger objective of analytical consistency in estimating 
benefits and costs across regulations and agencies, subject to statutory limitations.”104 Deviations from 
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cross-agency consistency, OIRA says, “may prevent achievement of the most risk reduction for a 
given level of resource expenditure.”105  
One of the EPA proposals presents itself as an effort to increase transparency in the use of 
scientific evidence.106 According to a leading scientific journal, however, “longtime observers of EPA, 
including former senior agency officials, see a more troubling and targeted goal: undermining key 
studies that have helped justify stricter limits on air pollution.”107 The proposed rule would require 
that for “the science pivotal to its significant regulatory actions, EPA will ensure that the data and 
models underlying the science is publicly available in a manner sufficient for validation and 
analysis.”108 As a footnote explains, this goal is to be accomplished by limiting the science that EPA 
can consider: 
EPA has the authority to establish policies governing its reliance on science in the administration 
of its regulatory functions. Historically, EPA has not consistently observed the policies underlying 
this proposal, and courts have at times upheld EPA’s use non-public data in support of its 
regulatory actions. . . . EPA is proposing to exercise its discretionary authority to establish a policy 
that would preclude it from using such data in future regulatory actions.109 
Because it could exclude important, well-validated studies if data could not be disclosed 
publicly, this limitation on the use of reliable, peer-reviewed data would be inconsistent with OIRA’s 
injunction to agencies to “provide documentation that the analysis is based on the best reasonably 
obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information available.”110  At one point, resistance to 
this proposal from the scientific community appeared to have had some effect, since the expected 
completion date of the rule was delayed until 2020 in EPA’s regulatory budget.111 But more recently, 
the EPA Administrator announced that “[i]t is not a back-burner issue,” and that “we will move 
forward to finalize that next year.”112 Thus, contrary to OIRA guidelines, EPA seems determined to 
adopt an exclusionary rule for probative scientific evidence in pursuit of its “transparency” goal. 
Another EPA initiative would restrict consideration of regulatory benefits, excluding any 
benefits that are not directly related to the regulated pollutant. In an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, EPA requested comment on whether the agency should develop a rule to limit “how the 
Agency will weigh the benefits from reductions in pollutants that were not directly regulated (often 
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called ‘co-benefits’ or ‘ancillary benefits.’”113 Limiting the consideration of ancillary benefits would 
be inconsistent with OIRA guidance that requires agencies to identify the “ancillary benefits” of 
proposed regulations and add those to the direct benefits and costs.114 OIRA instructs agencies that  
“[y]our analysis should look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs of your rulemaking and 
consider any important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks.”115  
These initiatives are significant, even if they prove not to result in the issuance of final rules, 
because they indicate the decreasing grip that CBA has as standard for rational, data-driven decision 
making. If cost-benefit analysis is supposed to ensure that regulations are adopted when (and only 
when) they benefit society, excluding probative scientific evidence or a major category of regulatory 
benefits is totally inconsistent with that goal. The fact that these EPA rules are seemingly moving 
forward may also be a signal of decreasing influence by OIRA, given that these initiatives in such 
tension with OIRA’s general guidance and its efforts to achieve uniformity across agencies have 
progressed as far as they have. 
To get a better sense of how cost-benefit analysis is actually being implemented in the Trump 
Administration, the next section will consider several case studies. The case studies stem from an 
agency that has often been the subject of criticism by anti-regulatory advocates, so it would appear to 
provide a good test case of the relevance  
IV. Application of Regulatory Review at EPA 
EPA has been a particular target of Republican ire and of the Trump. As Richard Revesz points 
out, this targeting is not reflective of existing cost-benefit analyses of the agency’s activities. Those 
analyses – including a report by OMB under the Trump Administration -- have indicated that EPA’s 
regulations have had large net benefits: 
In its 2017 summary of the costs and benefits of all major federal regulations for which costs 
and benefits had been estimated, OMB reported aggregate benefits of between $287 and $911 
billion and costs of only between $78 and $115 billion. Of these regulations, EPA rules 
account for over eighty percent of all monetized benefits—between $240 and $784 billion—
and over seventy percent of all monetized costs—between $65 and $85 billion.116  
EPA has also issued three studies of the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act; an EPA 
study covering 1990 to 2020, forecasting that air pollution regulations would produce annual net 
benefits of $1.9 trillion by 2020.117 Richard Revesz notes that these high net benefits are due to 
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the large public health benefits of EPA rules, with a projected 230,000 lives saved annually by 
2020.118 This amounts to roughly two million lives saved in the decade from 2010-2020.119  
Even if we assume that agencies systematically exaggerate benefits and underestimate 
costs, despite OIRA oversight, it is not easy to devise a theory to explain why OIRA has been 
dramatically less successful in policing EPA than other agencies. If we assume that the extent of 
the distortions in CBA at EPA are comparable to other agencies, the implication would be that 
EPA is relatively benign, in terms of net societal impact, compared to other agencies. Thus, the 
targeting of EPA does not seem reasonable if the concern is the net impact of regulations on 
society. On the other hand, given the figures cited above, targeting EPA is entirely plausible if the 
concern is purely on regulatory costs (ignoring benefits).  
A. The Social Cost of Carbon 
Estimating the benefits of reducing carbon emissions is particularly difficult. Modeling the 
long-term economic impact of climate change and the costs of adaptation and mitigation involves 
tremendous challenges.120 According to the Congressional Research Service, “[l]ong-term 
projections . . . should be viewed with skepticism. . . The finer the detail, the greater the skepticism 
should be.”121 Even the more confident economic modelers122 admit that attempts to estimate the 
impacts of climate change continue to be speculative.123As discussed in Part II, over multiple-
decadal time scales, a minor shift in the discount rate can dramatically impact the analysis of 
whether additional precautions are warranted. Given the very long-term effects of climate change, 
a small change in the discount rate can drive huge changes in the results. Yet, there is no consensus 
about what discount rate to use for climate change.124 
In 2009 the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (IWG) was convened to 
reduce the agency cacophony and provide a uniform estimate.125 The process was convened by 
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OMB and the Council of Economic Advisors.126 The other key participants were the agriculture, 
commerce, energy, transportation and treasury departments along with EPA.127  
Rather than develop its own model, the government decided to three existing models of the 
impact of climate change of varying degrees.128 It chose those three models as being frequently 
cited in the peer review literature and by the IPCC.129 The IWG recognized the incomplete and 
very uncertain nature of the models.130 But given the lack of good data about the connection 
between climate and economic impacts, the group was unable to identify a superior approach short 
of launching its own expensive and time-consuming research program.131  In addition, the 
Interagency Working Group limited itself to determining the benefits from relatively small 
increments in emissions, so the results do not necessarily apply in considering the benefits of more 
drastic changes in emissions policy.132 
One key issue about cost-benefit analysis in the climate context is the appropriateness of 
including international damages. The Interagency Working Group opted to include those damages 
because of the exceptional nature of the climate change problem.133  First, the IWG maintained, 
international damages must be included because of the global nature of climate change harms. 
Second, international cooperation is needed to address the issue.134 Moreover, the IWG argued in 
a separate subsection of its report, nearly all of the economics literature focused on global impacts, 
complicating any effort to derive a purely domestic estimate.135 The IWG also carefully considered 
the choice of discount rates.136 It concluded that a three percent rate was most defensible, but that 
reasonable arguments could be made for rates of 2.5% and 5%.137 Hence, although the Interagency 
Working Group viewed the three percent discount rate as the norm, it emphasized the “importance 
and value of considering the full range.”138 The IWG also believed it was useful to provide the 
cost corresponding to the ninety-fifth percentile of the model run estimates (at a three percent rate). 
This was intended to take into account the possibility of less likely but very damaging outcomes. 
In Executive Order 13783,139 President Trump disbanded the Interagency Working Group 
and directed that individual agencies recalculate the social cost of carbon following general OIRA 
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guidance on cost-benefit analysis “impacts and the consideration of appropriate discount rates.”140 
The new calculation considers only the direct harm of climate change on the United States (not 
globally) and uses a relatively high discount rate, which results in giving serious long-term harms 
from climate change much less weight. Whether global impacts should be included in the social 
cost of carbon has been the subject of considerable scholarly discussion.141 
Excluding global impacts is in tension with some internationally-oriented statutes bearing 
on the issue. Firs among these statutes is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Section 
102(2)(F) of NEPA,142 which directs each agency of the federal government to “recognize the 
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the 
foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and 
programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline 
in the quality of mankind’s world environment.” A second statute, section 115 of the Clean Air 
Act,143 requires EPA to take action whenever it “has reason to believe that any air pollutant or 
pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country.” Although EPA is yet to 
take action under the specific authority of section 115, this section indicates that global impacts 
were well within the scope of congressional concern. Finally, section 335 of the Defense 
Authorization Act of 2018 (HR 2810)144 states that it is the sense of Congress that “climate change 
is a direct threat to the national security of the United States and is impacting stability in areas of 
the world both where the United States Armed Forces are operating today, and where strategic 
implications for future conflict exist.” 
Regardless of the arguments on both sides, Trump’s executive order does not provide a 
rationale for ignoring global effects. As Cass Sunstein has said: “That decision may or may not be 
justifiable. But it was not justified. That is the height of arbitrariness.”  He adds that for this reason, 
the decision “should be invalidated in court.”145 Time will tell whether Sunstein’s forecast about 
the legal outcome holds true.  It is clear, in any event, that the choice to include only domestic 
damage is part of a larger trend in the Trump Administration of policy choices that truncate the 
consideration of regulatory benefits. 
B. Pollution Reduction Benefits 
A large share of the benefits from air pollution control comes from reducing the levels of 
particulates.146 Most of the benefits from reducing particulates are from reductions below the 
requirements of national air quality standards.147 As discussed in Part II, the Trump Administration 
is considering whether to eliminate these benefits from cost-benefit analysis of regulations that 
limit emissions of other pollutants but have the side-effect of reducing particulates.  Critics have 
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also argued that reductions below air quality standards do not have public health benefits.148 The 
Trump Administration has accepted this argument in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) for 
repealing the Clean Power Plan, President Obama’s signature climate change regulation.149 The 
RIA for this proposal contains three estimates of particulate impacts, two of which assume that the 
health effects of particulates are zero below some threshold.  That threshold is assumed to be either 
the lowest level at which health impacts have been found to date (in one estimate), or the air quality 
standard for particulates (in another.)150 EPA has not generally treated particulates or other 
pollutants subject to national air quality standards as having a threshold for harmful effects and 
has frequently stated the contrary.151 Some critics of regulation argue that there is a threshold below 
which particulates have no harmful effect.152 Recent epidemiological studies, however, provide 
evidence of harmful effects below the current national standard for particulates,153 and even the 
Reagan Administration treated particulates as having no threshold below which they were 
harmless.154 
Eliminating consideration of co-benefits would reverse forty years of EPA practice.155 
According to Kimberly Castle and Richard Revesz, “EPA has consistently and over multiple 
presidential administrations considered both co-benefits and their mirror image, indirect costs, in 
evaluating the consequences of regulation.”156 The lower courts have consistently held that EPA 
must consider indirect costs.157 The D.C. Circuit has also upheld EPA’s consideration of co-
benefits.158 Most strikingly, in Michigan v. EPA,159 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court 
emphatically admonished EPA to consider the full range of harms, direct and indirect, caused by 
regulation: “One would not say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions 
of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. In 
addition, ‘cost’ includes more than the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage 
could be termed a cost,” including environmental harms.160 The Trump Administration may have 
its work cut for it if it wants to persuade the courts that while “cost” including any disadvantage, 
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“benefit” excludes important advantages. Indeed, the cost of repealing a regulation includes the 
lost benefits of the regulation, and Michigan v. EPA suggests that agencies must take a broad view 
of costs. 
C.  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Key Deregulatory Initiatives. 
In this section, we examine how the Trump Administration has actually applied CBA in 
crucial administrative settings. It is impractical to cover every action taken by the Administration.  
Instead, we focus on three key deregulatory initiatives that rollback back Obama Administration 
initiatives to reduce carbon emissions from power plants, improve vehicle fuel efficiency (and 
thereby reduce carbon emissions), and protect wetlands.  
1. The Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule 
The Clean Power Plan161 was the Obama Administration’s most ambitious effort to reduce 
carbon emissions.162 Section 111(b) authorizes EPA to issue limitations for pollutants from new 
plants, and EPA did so for electric power plants. In order to regulate existing power plants—
especially existing coal-fired plants—EPA turned to section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.163 
Section 111(d) empowers EPA to require states to submit plans to control emissions from existing 
plants after it has issued a standard for new sources. The state plans are based on the best “system 
of continuous emission reduction” (BSER) that has been “adequately demonstrated” in terms of 
existing plants in that state. A crucial issue involved the scope of the term “system”—does it 
include only plant-specific emission reductions, or could a system be defined more broadly to 
include things like replacing coal with renewables? 
The Obama Administration decided to define the “system” of electrical power generation 
broadly under section 111(d). In defining the best standard of performance, the Obama EPA 
considered emission reduction strategies that could be applied to the electricity grid, such as 
increased use of renewable energy to allow reduced use of fossil fuel generators. Defining the 
system of pollution control to encompass changes in the amount of electricity introduced into the 
grid is a departure for EPA, which normally defines it as a type of pollution control equipment at 
the specific emitting facility 164  
The RIA offers analyses of regulatory benefits with various options for interest rates.  
Using the IWG’s preferred three-percent rate for carbon, the RIA found carbon reduction benefits 
of $25 per ton in 2025.165 If a seven percent rate is applied to co-benefits, the total benefits for that 
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year are $53-$84,166 meaning that the co-benefits are $28-$59 – at least as much as the carbon 
benefits or as much as twice as large, depending on what parts of the ranges are used. With a 
smaller discount rate applied to health benefits, co-benefits loom even larger.167  Still, the carbon 
benefits were not an inconsiderable part of the total benefits. If we were instead to focus on the 
risk-averse, 95th percentile figures from the IWG, the carbon benefits went up dramatically, to $92. 
The estimated compliance costs were much lower than any of these figures (in the range of $4-$7 
per ton),168 so that the proposal would have been justified in terms of either carbon benefits alone 
or co-benefits alone. In order to justify repeal, the Trump EPA had to slash both the social cost of 
carbon and the co-benefits. 
Besides rescinding the Obama-era estimate of the social cost of carbon, Executive Order 
13783 directed EPA to reconsider the Clean Power Plan.169 EPA obediently issued a proposal to 
rescind the Clean Power Plan and replace it with a new, much weaker regulation, the Affordable 
Clean Energy (ACE) rule.170 In its proposal for repealing the Clean Power Plan, the Trump 
Administration adopted an industry argument that the plan is invalid because EPA is limited to 
considering actions that can be implemented solely within the fence line of an individual emitter, 
such as installing new pollution control equipment. Recall that, in order to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions, the Plan would require utilities to scale back electricity generation at coal-fired plants 
in favor of generators using natural gas or renewable sources.171 In other words, according to the 
Trump Administration, section 111(d) is best read to authorize the agency to impose efficiency 
improvements for coal-fired plants but not to require that the electricity output of a coal-fired plants 
be reduced in favor of other sources of electricity. 
Resources for the Future, a highly regarded economics-oriented think tank, published a 
careful analysis of the ACE approach in comparison with the Clean Power Plan’s approach.172 The 
RFF economists concluded that at-the-source regulation like that in the ACE plan would result in 
a 2.6 percent decrease in carbon emissions compared with no regulation, while the Obama beyond-
the-source approach would product a 36 percent reduction.173 The ACE-type plan would also result 
                                               
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at ES-21 (Table ES-21).  EPA concluded: 
The EPA could not monetize some important benefits of the guidelines. Unquantified benefits include climate 
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in eighty-eight percent more sulfur dioxide emissions and fifty-six percent more nitrogen oxide 
emissions by 2030.174  
Given that the major projected benefits of the Clean Power Plan were to reduce carbon and 
particulate emissions, EPA’s efforts to downgrade both benefits (as discussed in the previous 
section) would also support the argument for repealing the plan.175 Although this effect is buried 
in the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), journalists quickly noticed that the plan would result in 
up to 1400 annual premature deaths due to particulates by 2030, whereas the Clean Power Plan 
would reduce avoid annual 1500-3600 premature deaths by that year.176 
The cost-benefit information in the RIA is difficult to digest because it is contained in 
several tables, each of which discusses several alternative approaches.177 EPA was unsure of just 
how much individual plants would be able to improve their performance or of cost of those 
improvements resulting in four implementation scenarios.178 The RIA notes that each scenario 
yielded “forgone climate benefits and forgone ancillary health co-benefits relative to the base case, 
which includes the CPP.”179 As directed by Trump’s executive order, EPA followed the OIRA 
guidance for discount rates (3 percent and 7 percent) and used domestic benefits rather than 
international ones.180 The RIA responds to neither the arguments made by the IWG for considering 
lower  discount rates or nor its reasons for including a risk averse estimate, nor its argument for 
using a global valuation of climate impacts.181 In terms of the evaluation of health risks, the RIA 
reports on the full range of concentrations and also on results assuming cut-offs such as eliminating 
any health effects below the national air quality standards. However, the RIA says it includes these 
cut-off estimates only as an indication of uncertainties at lower concentrations but that it primarily 
relies on the full-range estimates.182 Thus, the main reason for the much lower estimates of the 
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Clean Power Plan’s benefits, compared to those calculated under Obama, is that climate impacts 
have been drastically reduced by the shift to domestic estimates.183  
2.  Fuel Efficiency Standards: The SAFE Rule 
Another major Trump Administration initiative is the attempt to freeze fuel efficiency 
standards for vehicles. Section 202 of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to impose standards for 
emissions from new motor vehicles once it has found that a pollutant endangers human health or 
welfare.184 During the Obama Administration, EPA issued such standards for greenhouse gases, 
in tandem with the National Highway Traffic Administration (NHTSA), which regulates fuel 
efficiency standards for vehicles.185 The car industry was already under pressure because of 
regulations adopted in California, so the agencies were not writing on a blank slate.186 Those 
standards were scheduled to become increasingly strict for the next several years. The 
Administration proposed freezing the standards at their current levels.187 Such a regulatory freeze 
could cause problems for car manufacturers, because California has its own standards for vehicle 
carbon emissions.188 Consequently, the manufacturers opposed freezing the standard and urged the 
Administration to negotiate a compromise with California.189 
EPA and NHTSA eschewed compromise and took a different approach in its proposed 
SAFE rule.190 It not only proposed freezing the national standards but also proposed to preempt 
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California’s standards.191  The agencies estimated that costs would decrease by $502 billion at a 
three-percent discount rate ($335 billion at a seven-percent discount rate), while benefits would 
decrease by $326 billion, as compared with implementing the Obama-era rule.192 Industry 
remained unenthusiastic. The head of one major car company announced that "Ford is leading in 
this regard. ... We're in favor of keeping the standard, not a rollback. We have plans to meet it."193 
The Washington Post reported that “[s]taffers at the Environmental Protection Agency 
strongly criticized the logic behind a recent move to loosen future gas mileage rules for cars, at 
one point requesting that the EPA’s name and logo be removed from a key regulatory report.”194 
According to the Post, while NHTSA claimed that freezing the standards would save lives, “EPA’s 
internal analysis suggested the opposite — that freezing the Obama-era rules would lead to slightly 
more fatalities (seven for every trillion miles driven), cost jobs, and in economic terms, have a net 
negative impact of $83 billion.”195 EPA staff notified OIRA of its technical disagreement and said 
the draft Regulatory Impact Statement should not be attributed to EPA; as far as we can tell from 
the public record, they were ignored.196 It is possible, however, that OIRA raised these concerns 
but was overruled.  
Be that as it may, the proposal’s RIA has also come under fire from economists outside the 
agency.  The RIA relies on NHTSA models to project effects on fuel use, vehicle miles traveled, 
and accident rates for new and used vehicles.197 The direct benefits of fuel efficiency, in this 
analysis, are countered by the higher cost of new cars (which leaves more older, less efficient cars 
on the road), by higher accident rates (due to smaller, lighter cars), and by an increase in the number 
of miles driven.198 But the RIA appears to be internally inconsistent in its treatment of these issues, 
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according to independent economists. Moreover, it appears, traffic safety experts sharply dispute 
the large reductions in deaths projected from the SAFE rule.199 
RFF analysts faulted the RIA for assuming that the overall number of vehicles falls with 
the regulatory freeze despite lower prices for new vehicles.200 They say that “[o]n its face, this is 
inconsistent with economics.”201 Moreover, the RIA assumes that at the same time that there are 
fewer vehicles, there will be more miles driven, which again seems inconsistent and “inconsistent 
with economics.”202 These dubious assumptions “are key because they result in significant 
reductions in external costs (such as congestion) and increases in safety from the change in vehicle 
ages and decreased driving under the proposed new rule.”203 Finally, the RFF analysts concluded 
that assumptions about vehicle use and fuel consumption played a major role in the proposed rule 
and were based on assumptions about consumer behavior that were not supported by the economic 
literature.204 
Similarly, Berkeley economist James Sallee critiqued the economic analysis for “trying to 
have its cake and eat it too by claiming tighter standards will force consumers to buy less desirable 
cars, but they will still want to drive them more.”205 He also criticized the report for ignoring the 
effect of the more expensive cars required by the Obama rule on depreciation costs, which makes 
it more expensive to pile-on mileage, and he concludes that EPA’s aggressive estimates for the 
rebound effect do not pair well with its assumption about driving.206  
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Even the economists whose work the government relied on have denounced the cost-
benefit analysis.  In a December 2018  article in the journal Science, they concluded that “[t]he 
2018 analysis has fundamental flaws and inconsistencies, is at odds with basic economic theory 
and empirical studies, is misleading, and does not improve estimates of costs and benefits of fuel 
economy standards beyond those in the 2016 analysis.”207 Like other outside economists, they 
suggest that part of the Administration’s analysis flunks Econ 101: 
The 2018 proposal argues that the rollback in standards will shrink the overall fleet by 6 
million vehicles in the year 2029, compared with the current standards. This is inconsistent 
with basic economic principles. If prices of vehicles decrease (relative to other general-
purpose goods), we expect more individuals to purchase vehicles and drive them rather than 
use other modes of travel.208 
Of the three proposed rules studied, the cost-benefit analysis for the CAFÉ rollback seems 
clearly the weakest. The other two have their problems, but at least seem to be internally consistent. 
If it is true that EPA pushed back against the proposed freeze, that would seem to speak well for 
Administrator Wheeler, given that the proposal is so deeply flawed.  
3.   Wetland and Stream Protection 
The final case study turns from air emissions to water ways, dealing with the fundamental 
question of what waters are covered by the federal statute regulating pollution and filling of waters. 
The Clean Water Act applies to “navigable waters,” which are defined by section 502(7) as the 
“waters of the United States.”209 It is clear that at the very least the term includes what were 
traditionally called navigable waters, meaning bodies of water that could be used commercially 
for transportation. The difficulty has come from defining the boundaries of federal authority over 
small waterbodies and wetlands. The Supreme Court has decided three cases interpreting this 
phrase. The first two were relatively clearly, but the third decision has caused great confusion. In 
the first case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Home, Inc.,210 the Court held that wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters were subject to federal jurisdiction. In the second case, Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County [SWANCC] v. U.S. Army Corp of Engineers,211 the Court struck 
down a regulation that made all bodies of water subject to federal jurisdiction if they are used by 
migratory birds. The case involved a small isolated body of water that was not connected even 
indirectly with navigable waters. 
That brings us to the third case, Rapanos v. United States.212 Rapanos involved an area that 
was sometimes saturated with water, having previously been a wetland before it was filled. The 
nearest body of navigable water was at least ten miles away. Four Justices voted to uphold the 
government’s claim that it had jurisdiction, but they were in the minority.  Another four Justices, 
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led by Justice Scalia, defined federal authority narrowly, to include only open bodies of water such 
as continuously flowing streams and only wetlands that do not have a clear boundary from those 
open bodies of water. Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote for the majority.  He rejected the 
Scalia test.  Instead, he said, to have authority over a wetland, the government must show a 
substantial nexus between that wetland and a non-navigable tributary of a navigable body of water. 
(For instance, the wetland might store water that ultimately goes into the tributary.) This issue 
would be decided on the basis of the facts in each individual case. Thus, this situation is twice 
removed from the navigable waters that are clearly covered by the statute, first by the non-
navigable tributary and then by the interconnected wetland. The decision caused confusion in the 
lower courts, with many lower courts viewing Kennedy’s approach as legally binding and no court 
relying solely on Scalia’s view.213 
In an effort to provide additional clarity, the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA jointly 
issued the Waters of the United States guidance document, often called WOTUS for short.214  It 
was unclear whether the trial courts or the appeals courts had jurisdiction over the rule, so 
challengers to WOTUS filed suits at both levels.  One court of appeals issued a nationwide 
injunction against enforcing WOTUS. But the Supreme Court ruled that only the trial courts have 
jurisdiction and reversed the injunction.215  While all this was happening, Trump took office. 
President Trump once again initiated the repeal process. His executive order has the 
expansive title, “Presidential Executive Order on Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and 
Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States Rule.’”216 The executive order 
also directs consideration of replacing the rule with Justice Scalia’s very restrictive definition from 
Rapanos.217 EPA and the Army Corps gave notice of their intent to repeal WOTUS and replace it 
with prior administrative practice until a replacement rule can be formulated.218  
The advanced notice of proposed ruling  specifically stated that it did not rely on the cost-
benefit analysis as a basis for the rule.219 This was a somewhat surprising deviation from the 
general norm, established in a series of executive orders, of maximizing net social benefits from 
regulatory decisions to the extent permitted by statute.220 In any event, the cost-benefit analysis 
came under serious criticism. In an article in Science, three environmental economists (two of them 
                                               
213 See N. Cal. Riverwatch v. City of Healdsburg, 456 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir 2007); United States v. Gerke 
Excavating, 404 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1sr Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction can 
be established under either the Kennedy or Scalia tests); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir.2009) 
(same test as Johnson). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have adopted their own approaches or dodged the issue. United 
States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Candiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210-213 (6th Cir. 2009). 
214 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States, 80 FED. REG. 37053 (June 29, 2015). 
215 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018). 
216 82 FED. REG. 12497 (Feb. 28, 2017). Section 2 of the executive order calls for reconsideration of WOTUS. 
217 Id.  § 3. 
218 Definition of “Waters of the United States”-Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 FED. REG. 32227 (July 7, 2017). 
219 The rule states: “While economic analyses are informative in the rulemaking context, the agencies are not relying 
on the economic analysis performed pursuant to Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and related procedural 
requirements as a basis for this proposed action.” Id.  at. .  This may be an effort to avoid judicial review of the cost-
benefit analysis, since the next sentence reads: “See, e.g., NAHB, 682 F.3d at 1039–40 (noting that the quality of an 
agency’s economic analysis can be tested under the APA if the ‘agency decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as 
part of its rulemaking’).” Id. 
220 See Part II for a discussion of these orders. 
 35 
well-known senior figures) fault the analysis for eliminating ninety percent of the estimated 
benefits projected under WOTUS. They say they can find “no defensible or consistent basis for 
decision to exclude what amounts to the largest category of benefits from the 2017 RIA,” those 
benefits being the intrinsic value of wetlands based on contingent valuation studies.221 The RIA 
excluded the critical contingent valuation studies based on their age, but was not consistent in 
applying this age-based exclusion elsewhere in the report, nor did the RIA provide reasons for 
thinking that the results were no longer valid.222 Moreover, the RIA ignored ten more recent 
studies.223 
The proposed rule224 was published in December 2018 just before completion of this 
article. Unlike Justice Scalia’s Rapanos opinion, which it follows only in part,  the proposal does 
not contend that its interpretation is unambiguously required by the statute, only that the agencies 
“are proposing outer bounds for their authority under the Act that they consider objective and 
reasonable, and that are consistent with its text, structure, legislative history and applicable 
Supreme Court precedent.”225  The actual effects of the proposal remain unclear; a news report on 
the proposal had the apt title, “Trump Waters Proposal Narrower with Impact Clear as Mud.”226  
The cost-benefit analysis accompanying the proposal227  provides only an incomplete 
assessment of lost regulatory benefits. The agencies professed to be unable to determine the 
number of wetlands that would be affected by paring back not only the WOTUS rule but also the 
pre-2015 rules that preceded WOTUS.228 To get an estimate, it investigated three case studies and 
then attempted to scale the results up to the national level.229  The estimates did take into account 
                                               
221 Kevin J. Boule, Matthew J. Kotchen, and V. Kerry Smith, Deciphering Dueling Analyses of Clean Water 
Regulations, 358 SCIENCE 49, 49 (2017). 
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224 Department of Defense and Environmental Protection Agency, Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States” 
(Dec. 11, 2018) (prepublication copy), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/wotus_2040-
af75_nprm_frn_2018-12-11_prepublication2_1.pdf 
225 Id. at 59.  
226 Trump Waters Proposal Narrower With Impact Clear as Mud, Bloomberg Environmental News (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/trump-waters-proposal-narrower-with-impact-
clear-as-mud. 
227 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Department of the Army, Economic Analysis for the Proposed Revised 
Definition of “Waters of the United States” (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
12/documents/wotusproposedrule_ea_final_2018-12-10.pdf, 
228 Id. at vi. There may be some reason to doubt this assertion: 
U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration says it doesn't know how many streams it is proposing to 
exclude from Clean Water Act jurisdiction today. 
 But a 2017 slideshow prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of 
Engineers staff shows that at least 18% of streams and 51% of wetlands nationwide would not be protected 
under the new definition of "waters of the United States," or WOTUS, announced today. 
Ariel Wittenberg and Kevin Bogardus, EPA Claims ‘No Data’ on Impact of Weakening Water Rule. But the Numbers 
Exist, SCIENCE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/12/epa-claims-no-data-impact-weakening-
water-rule-numbers-exist. 
229 EPA and Dept. of the Army, supra note 227, at 125. 
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the four out of ten wetlands-valuation studies that it found methodologically sound.230 Even so, 
the agencies were only able to quantify the effects of the their proposed rule on dredging-and-
filling of wetlands and other areas, but not its effects on other types of federal regulations.231  At 
this writing, professional assessments of the cost-benefit analysis have not yet appeared.  Clearly, 
however, it varies sharply from the 2015 WOTUS analysis and seemingly, although to a lesser 
extent, from the initial cost-benefit analysis accompanying the advanced notice of proposed 
rulemaking. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Of the three high-profile rules discussed in Part IV, the RIA for the Clean Power Plan 
replacement (ACE) may have the best claim to justify the corresponding proposed regulation, 
although there are some significant issues about its treatment of foreign climate impacts, its choices 
of discounts rates, and its treatment of co-benefits. Thus, while it may be stronger than the others, 
its superiority is only relative. If independent economists as to be believed, there are glaring flaws 
in the analysis of the free on fuel efficiency standards (the SAFE rule), and the agencies themselves 
admit severe limitations on the cost-benefit analysis of the WOTUS replacement, such as their 
inability to determine how many wetlands and streams would be affected. Overall, this is not an 
impressive track record. 
Despite some triumphalist statements about the ascendancy of cost-benefit analysis,232 its 
status at present seems a bit shaky. As we have seen, President Trump has placed agenda controls 
on agencies that focus primarily on eliminating regulatory costs rather than maximizing regulatory 
benefits.  The Administration has also begun initiatives to limit the evidence that can be considered 
in EPA cost-benefit analysis and to eliminate an important class of regulatory benefits from 
consideration. OIRA has either been unable to insist that EPA comply with its guidelines or has 
been overruled.  The cost-benefit analyzes for major EPA deregulatory initiatives also seem to 
have substantial analytic gaps. While it is possible that either OIRA or the agency will correct 
those flaws before rules become finalized, OIRA was apparently unable or unwilling to do so at 
the outset. To extent that the Trump Administration has the approval of conservatives or 
Republicans generally in its approach to regulatory analysis, these developments raise questions 
about future political support for making professionally sound cost-benefit analysis the centerpiece 
of the regulatory process.  
There is much in the Trump Administration that deviates from normal governmental 
practice,233 so it may be unfair to assess either OIRA or cost-benefit analysis on that basis.234  Still, 
                                               
230 Id. at 63. 
231 See id. at xi. 
232 See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 3 (heralding the “revolution” brought about by cost-benefit analysis). The title of 
the chapter is “The Triumph of the Technocrats.” Id. 
233 See Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration Under Trump (August 8, 2017), available at  
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015591 
234 It bears remembering, however, that much of his regulatory policy is squarely within the mainstream of Republican 
Party views.  For instance, Speaker Paul Ryan has also supported agencies to comply with a regulatory budget. See 
Tim Davaney, Speaker Ryan to Call for Major Regulatory Reforms, THE HILL (June 14, 2016), available at 
https://thehill.com/regulation/legislation/283369-speaker-ryan-to-call-for-major-regulatory-reforms.  
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for those who were already skeptical of cost-benefit analysis and considered it merely a façade for 
blocking regulation whenever possible, the Trump experience may do little to quiet their fears. On 
the contrary, the experience of the Trump Administration may strengthen the argument that cost- 
benefit analysis is too malleable to be considered reliable. This argument may find support in the 
fact that EPA has been able to issue cost-benefit analyzes first supporting major environmental 
initiatives under Obama, and then done a U-turn on the basis of new cost-benefit analysis, all with 
the approval of OIRA. Of course, if it turns out that none of the cost-benefit analyzes hold up in 
court, or even if it turns out that professional economists have a clear verdict about which ones 
were correct, the blame would have to shift from the methodology itself to the politics of its 
implementation.  
With a bit less than two years of the Trump Administration behind us, it is too early to 
attempt a definitive verdict on its use of CBA. We will be in a much better position to pass 
judgment at the end of his presidency. But what we have seen so far raises serious questions both 
as to this Administration’s practices and as to the future trajectory of federal cost-benefit analysis. 
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Appendix:  
Regulations Subject to CRA Resolutions 
 
 
Title of 
Regulation 
Was the 
Rule 
Repealed 
Using 
CRA? 
Was 
There a 
Senate 
vote? 
Was 
There a 
House 
vote? 
Federal 
Register Cite 
RIN Public Law Cite 
Methane and 
Natural Gas Waste 
Rule 
No – it was 
voted down 
Yes – 
voted 
down 
Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
83008 
1004-AE14 Not Applicable 
Fair Pay and Safe 
Workplaces EO 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
58562 
9000-AM81 Pub. L. 115-11 
Women’s Health 
Care Protections 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
91852 
937-AA04 Pub. L. 115-23 
Stream Protection 
Rule 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
93066 
 
1029-AC63 Pub. L. 115-5 
Gun Limits for the 
Severely Mentally 
Ill 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
91702 
 
0960-AH95 Pub. L. 115-8 
Oil Anti-
Corruption Rule 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
49359 or 81 
Fed. Reg. 49360 
3235-AL53 Pub. L. 115-4 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
Drug Test Rules 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
50298 
 
1205-AB63 
 
Pub. L. 115-17 
BLM’s Land Use 
Planning Rule 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
89580 
1004-AE39 Pub. L. 115-12 
Wildlife Refuge 
Oil and Gas Rule 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
79948 
1018-AX36 Not Applicable 
Drilling 
Safeguards in 
National Parks 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
77972 
1024-AD78 Not Applicable 
Mitigation Policy 
Protecting 
Wildlife Habitats 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
83440 
 
Not Available Not Applicable 
Rule to Close Tax 
Inversion 
Loopholes 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
72858 
 
1545-BN40 
 
Not Applicable 
Drilling Civil 
Penalties Update 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
50306 
1012-AA05 Not Applicable 
Drilling Security 
and Safety 
Standards 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
81356 
 
1004-AE15 Not Applicable 
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ESSA 
Accountability 
and State Plan 
Rules 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
86076 
 
1810-AB27 Pub. L. 115-13 
ESSA Teacher 
Preparation 
Standards 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
75494 
1840-AD07 Pub. L. 115-14 
Chemical Facility 
Safeguards 
No No No 82 Fed. Reg. 
4594 
2050-AG82 Not Applicable 
Mitigation Policy 
Protecting 
Endangered 
Species 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
95316 
 
Not Available Not Applicable 
State Retirement 
Savings Plans 
Rules – 81 Fed. 
Reg. 92639 
 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
92639 
1210-AB76 Pub. L. 115-24 
State Retirement 
Savings Plans 
Rules – 81 Fed. 
Reg. 59464 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
59464 
1210-AB71 Pub. L. 115-35 
Oil Drilling 
Measurement 
Standards 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
81516 
1004-AE17 
 
Not Applicable 
Alaska National 
Wildlife Refuges 
Rule 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
52247 
1018-BA31 Pub. L. 115-20 
Artic Drilling 
Safeguards 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
46477 
1082-AA00 Not Applicable 
Coal Valuation 
Rule 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
43337 
1012-AA13 Not Applicable 
Prepaid Card Rule No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
83934 
3170-AA22 Not Applicable 
ACF River Basin 
Water Control 
Standards 
No No No Not Available Not Available Not Applicable 
Gas Drilling 
Measurement 
Standards 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
81462 
 
1004-AE16 Not Applicable 
OSHA 
Recordkeeping 
Rule 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
91792 
1218-AC84 
 
Pub. L. 115-21 
Cross-State Air 
Pollution Update 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
74504 
2060-AS05 Not Applicable 
Broadband 
Privacy 
Protections 
Yes Yes Yes 81 Fed. Reg. 
87274 
 
Not Available Pub. L. 115-22 
Utah Regional 
Haze Rule 
No No No 81 Fed. Reg. 
43893 
Not Available Not Applicable 
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Energy Efficiency 
Test Procedures 
for Compressors 
No No No 82 Fed Reg. 
1052 
 
1904-AD43 Not Applicable 
Arbitration Rule Yes Yes Yes 82 Fed. Reg. 
33210 
3170-AA51 Pub. L. 115-74 
Payday Lending 
Rules 
No No No 82 Fed. Reg. 
54472 
3170-AA40 Not Applicable 
Net Neutrality No Yes No 83 Fed. Reg. 
7852 
 
Not Available Not Applicable 
Indirect Auto 
Lending Guidance 
Yes Yes Yes Not Available Not Available Pub. L. 115-172 
 
 
 
